Innocent III and his time. From 'absolute' papal monarchy to the Fourth Lateran Council, Vergentis, Revista de Investigación de la Catedra Internacional Conjunta Inocencio III, n. 2, 2016
all information here
Stephen Tierney & Neil Walker, "Through a Glass, Darkly: Reflections on James Lorimer’s International Law" (409-413) (PDF)
Martti Koskenniemi, "Race, Hierarchy and International Law: Lorimer’s Legal Science" (415-429) (PDF)
Gerry Simpson, "James Lorimer and the Character of Sovereigns: The Institutes as 21st Century Treatise" (431-446) (PDF)
Karen Knop, "Lorimer’s Private Citizens of the World" (447-475) (PDF)
Stephen C. Neff, "Heresy in Action: James Lorimer's Dissident Views on War and Neutrality" (PDF)
When examined collectively the trade and colonization charters that Tudor and Stuart monarchs issued demonstrate a developing English conception of world order based on trade monopolies and not on ecclesiastical premises or on the Grotian notion of freedom of the seas. There were therefore three early modern conceptions of how an international order might be created, not one, all of which affected European trade with the Americas and Asia. They all began with the assumption that the discovery of the several new worlds required developing rules of engagement to reduce if not to eliminate conflict among the European nations engaged in overseas exploration, settlement, and trade. As Koen Stapelbroek has pointed out, understanding the role of legal notions in the actual historical creation and gradually evolving function of a new kind of commercial-political entity, requires a distinctly non-doctrinal focus.More information here.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was the final appellate court of the British Empire. In 1935 the Irish Free State was recognized as the first part of the Empire to abolish the appeal to the Privy Council. This book examines the controversial Irish appeal to the Privy Council in the wider context of the history of the British Empire in the early 20th century. In particular, it analyses Irish resistance to the imposition of the appeal in 1922 and the attempts to abolish it at the Imperial conferences of the 1920s and 1930s. This book also outlines the means by which Irish governments attempted to block Privy Council appeals. It examines the reality of claims that the Privy Council appeal offered a means of safeguarding the rights of the Protestant minority within the Irish Free State. Finally, it reveals British intentions that the Privy Council act as the guardian and enforcer of the settlement embodied in the 1921 Anglo Irish Treaty. The conclusion to this work explains why the Privy Council was unsuccessful in protecting this settlement.On the author:
Thomas Mohr is a lecturer at the School of Law, University College Dublin. He is honorary secretary of the Irish Legal History Society.The book can be ordered for € 45 with the Four Courts Press.
Popular sovereignty—the doctrine that the public powers of the state originate in a concessive grant of power from ‘the people’—is perhaps the cardinal doctrine of modern constitutional theory. Its classic formulation is to be found in the major theoretical treatments of the modern state, such as in the treatises of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, and it functions as a model in the design of modern constitutions, by locating the source of such public power in a putative ‘We the People’ anterior to public institutions. This book explores the intellectual origins of this constitutional doctrine in later medieval and early modern legal thought. Key to the operation of this doctrine was the legal science of Roman law, long regarded as the principal source for modern legal reasoning in Western jurisprudence. Roman law had a profound impact on the major architects of popular sovereignty doctrine, such as Baldus de Ubaldis, François Hotman, Jean Bodin, Johannes Althusius, and Hugo Grotius. The book illustrates how these jurists strategically integrated the juridical language of obligations, property, personality, as well as the model of the Roman constitution, into their analysis, locating the right of sovereignty in the people at large, as the exclusive owners of state authority. In recovering the origins of popular sovereignty in this way, the book demonstrates the vital importance of Roman law as one of the major sources of modern constitutionalism.Table of contents:
Introduction: Popular Sovereignty, Constitutionalism, and the Civil LawMore information on the publisher's website.
1 The Lex Regia: The Theory of Popular Sovereignty in the Roman Law Tradition
2 The Medieval Law of Peoples
3 Roman Law and the Renaissance State: Dominium, Jurisdiction, and the Humanist Theory of Princely Authority
4 Popular Resistance and Popular Sovereignty: Roman Law and the Monarchomach Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty
5 The Roman Law Foundations of Bodin’s Early Doctrine of Sovereignty
6 Jean Bodin, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Government
7 Popular Sovereignty, Civil Association, and the Respublica: Johannes Althusius and the German Publicists
8 Popular Liberty, Princely Government, and the Roman Law in Hugo Grotius’ De Iure Belli ac Pacis
9 Popular Sovereignty and the Civil Law in Stuart Constitutional Thought Conclusion
Religious freedom is widely recognized today as a basic human right, guaranteed by nearly all national constitutions. Exporting Freedom charts the rise of religious freedom as an ideal firmly enshrined in international law and shows how America’s promotion of the cause of individuals worldwide to freely practice their faith advanced its ascent as a global power.
Anna Su traces America’s exportation of religious freedom in various laws and policies enacted over the course of the twentieth century, in diverse locations and under a variety of historical circumstances. Influenced by growing religious tolerance at home and inspired by a belief in the United States’ obligation to protect the persecuted beyond its borders, American officials drafted constitutions as part of military occupations—in the Philippines after the Spanish–American War, in Japan following World War II, and in Iraq after 2003. They also spearheaded efforts to reform the international legal order by pursuing Wilsonian principles in the League of Nations, drafting the United Nations Charter, and signing the Helsinki Accords during the Cold War. The fruits of these labors are evident in the religious freedom provisions in international legal instruments, regional human rights conventions, and national constitutions.
In examining the evolution of religious freedom from an expression of the civilizing impulse to the democratization of states and, finally, through the promotion of human rights, Su offers a new understanding of the significance of religion in international relations.
In Marital Cruelty in Antebellum America, Robin C. Sager probes the struggles ofaggrieved spouses shedding light on the nature of marriage and violence in the United States in the decades prior to the Civil War. Analyzing over 1,500 divorce records that reveal intimate details of marriages in conflict in Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin from 1840–1860, Sager offers a rare glimpse into the private lives of ordinary Americans shaken by accusations of cruelty.
At a time when the standard for an ideal marriage held that both partners adequately perform their respective duties, hostility often arose from ongoing domestic struggles for power. Despite a rise in the then novel expectation of marriage as a companionate relationship, and even in the face of liberalized divorce grounds, marital conflicts often focused on violations of duty, not lack of love. Sager describes how, in this environment, cruelty was understood as a failure to fulfill expectations and as a weapon to brutally enforce more traditional interpretations of marital duty.
Sager’s findings also challenge historical literature’s assumptions about the regional influences on violence, showing that married southerners were no more or less violent than their midwestern counterparts. Her work reveals how definitions and perceptions of cruelty varied according to the gender of victim and perpetrator. Correcting historical mischaracterizations of women’s violence as trivial, rare, or defensive, Sager finds antebellum wives both capable and willing to commit a wide variety of cruelties within their marriages. Her research provides details about the reality of nineteenth-century conjugal unions, including the deep unhappiness buried within them.
We tend to think of global migration and the problem of which legal rights people enjoy as they cross borders as modern phenomena. They are not. The question of emigrant rights was one of the foundational issues in what can be called the constitution of the English empire at the beginning of transatlantic colonization in the seventeenth century. This essay analyzes one strand of this constitutionalism, a strand captured by the resonant term, ‘the liberties and privileges of Englishmen’. Almost every colonial grant – whether corporate charter, royal charter, or proprietary grant – for roughly two dozen imagined, projected, failed, and realized overseas ventures contained a clause stating that the emigrants would enjoy the liberties, privileges and immunities of English subjects. The clause was not invented for transatlantic colonization. Instead, it had medieval roots. Accordingly, royal drafters, colonial grantees, and settlers penned and read these guarantees against the background of traditional interpretations about what they meant. Soon, however, the language of English liberties and privileges escaped the founding documents, and contests over these keywords permeated legal debates on the meaning and effects of colonization. Just as the formula of English liberties and privileges became a cornerstone of England’s constitutional monarchy, it also became a foundation of the imperial constitution. As English people brought the formula west, they gave it new meanings, and then they returned with it to England and created entirely new problems. Liberties and privileges claims fell into five functional categories. First, the claim that colonists abroad and their descendants enjoyed English liberties functioned as an open door, allowing overseas colonists to return home to England and be treated as equal English subjects. Second, the king or his colonial deputies might make positive grants of English liberties to subjects in a royal territory outside England as an inducement for English subjects to migrate there. Here, the grant of English liberties and privileges functioned as a window, a transparent promise of familiar and cherished rights to encourage settlement. Third, already by the time of the English Civil War and more frequently by century’s end, the colonists themselves sometimes claimed English liberties, privileges, and immunities abroad as a floor below which governors could not push. Fourth, in the reverse of the second, the claim that overseas subjects had to be governed according to English standards, including English liberties and privileges, could function as a ceiling on colonial innovation. It was a ceiling measured by metropolitan officials, especially the Privy Council as it reviewed colonial statutes and judicial cases to ensure that they were, in the familiar language of colonial grants, ‘agreeable’ with and ‘not repugnant’ to the laws of England. Finally, colonial assumptions of English liberties functioned as a mirror through which colonists could see themselves as English, even when their colonial rights, such as their property rights, were viewed at home as peculiar. If for example a subject of the English king in an overseas dominion owned slaves in that dominion and wished to sojourn home, could he bring his slaves? Could he carry the rights of a Virginian or Jamaican with him to England and enjoy those rights there? Collapsing English and local liberties, slaveholders argued affirmatively. As Englishmen they should, they thought, be able to move around the empire with their property, including human property.Download this text on SSRN.
This Article examines the early modern revival and subtle transformation in what is here called the merchants’ chapter of Magna Carta and then analyzes how lawyers, judges, and government officeholders invoked it in the new American federal courts and in debates over congressional power. In the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 1790s, a British creditor and an American State debated the meaning and applicability of the merchants’ chapter, which guaranteed two rights to foreign merchants: free entry and exit during peacetime, without being subjected to arbitrary taxes; and, in wartime, the promise that their persons and goods would not be harmed or confiscated, unless their own king attacked and confiscated English merchants. In other words, no harm to enemy aliens, except as retaliation. Tit for tat.Download this text on SSRN.
The idea that reciprocity was a fundamental mechanism of international (and interpersonal) relations became something like a social science axiom in the early modern Enlightenment. Edward Coke claimed to find that mechanism in the merchants’ chapter and publicized it to lawyers throughout the emerging British Empire and beyond. Montesquieu lauded the English for protecting foreign commerce in their fundamental law, and Blackstone basked in that praise. American lawyers derived their understanding of the merchants’ chapter from these sources and then, in the early Republic, stretched the principle behind it to protect foreign capital, not just resident merchants. The vindication of old imperial debt contracts would signal to all international creditors that, in the United States, credit was safe. Federalists then invoked the chapter outside of the courts to resist Republican attempts to embargo commerce and sequester foreign credit. For Republicans, doux commerce had become the Achilles heel of the great Atlantic empires: their reliance on American trade could be used to gain diplomatic leverage without risking war. For Federalists, economic sanctions threatened not just their fiscal policy but their entire vision of an Atlantic world that increasingly insulated international capital from national politics. They all agreed, however, that the role of foreign capital in the American constitutional system was a central issue for the new and developing nation.
Taking a cue from Bernadette Atuahene’s concept of “dignity takings” and her insight that government expropriation inflicts more than economic injury, this essay analyzes how American revolutionaries defined political membership, penalized and expropriated British loyalists, and then allowed some to join the American polity in the decade after the Revolution. Many recovered their property, professions, and legal privileges. However, because most loyalists could choose to remain loyal or join the Revolution, they did not lose human dignity as Atuahene defines it. Case studies of two reintegrating lawyers, Richard Harison and William Rawle, explore loyalism, the loss of dignities that loyalists suffered, and some paths toward reintegration. Their appointment as federal attorneys helped make the government conversant in the common law, British statutes, and the law of nations, which in turn supported the Federalist goal of reintegrating the United States into the Atlantic World: achieving, in other words, national dignity.
Éric Bousmar, Philippe Desmette, Nicolas Simon, IntroductionÉric Bousmar, Philippe Desmette, Nicolas Simon, Du droit, des institutions et des hommes. Les itinéraires de Jean-Marie Cauchies
Publications de Jean-Marie Cauchies
Le moyen âge entre coutumes et droit édictal : Italie, Savoie, France d’oc et d’oïl (IXe-XVe siècle)Antonio Padoa-Schioppa, La giustizia ecclesiastica nei Sinodi lombardi dell’età carolingia
Florian Mariage, Pouvoirs et institutions au village : décodage de quelques « chartes-lois » du Tournaisis (XIIIe siècle)
Albert Rigaudière, Policer la ville et protéger la campagne. Nîmes 1353-1363
Gérard Guyon (†), L’apport des juges dans la formation et le développement du droit coutumier. L’exemple des coutumes médiévales bordelaises
Franco Morenzoni, Quelques remarques à propos d’un manuscrit du Compendium statutorum generalis reformacionis Sabaudie de la Zentralbibliothek de Zurich
Jean-Louis Gazzaniga, La pragmatique sanction attribuée à saint Louis (1268) dans le débat gallican (XVIe – XIXe siècle)
Justice, gouvernement et législation dans les Pays-Bas espagnols (XVIe-XVIIe siècle)Monique Vleeschouwer-Van Melkebeek, Incestum commisit. Contrôle et répression des relations charnelles et des mariages incestueux par le tribunal de l’officialité de Tournai au début du XVIe siècle
Emmanuël Falzone, Princeps conventionis lege obligetur. Le pouvoir du Prince et ses limites dans un consilium de Leoninus au comte d’Egmont (Conseil des Troubles, 1567-1568)
Gustaaf Janssens, L’abolition du Conseil des Troubles du duc d’Albe, un conseil « communément haï » aux Pays-Bas (1573-1576)
Hugo De Schepper, Une législation de circonstance aux Pays- Bas sous le gouvernement personnel d’Alexandre Farnèse, 1579-1589 * Nicolas SIMON, Une culture d’État ? Législation et prise de décision dans les Pays-Bas espagnols (1580-1610)
Réglementation et législation dans la monarchie française, des Pays-Bas au Canada (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)
Alain Wijffels, La loi dans le discours judiciaire : l’article 15 de l’Édit Perpétuel de 1611 dans le ressort du Parlement de Flandre
Dominique Gaurier, Les préambules des ordonnances françaises aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles : propagande royale ou véritable programme législatif ?
Serge Dauchy, Faisons deffenses de traitter ny donner aucunes boissons enyvrantes aux Sauvages. Politique coloniale et conflits de pouvoir en Nouvelle-France (1657-1668)
Les Pays-Bas autrichiens et le royaume des Pays-Bas. Des Lumières aux Révolutions : Ancien Régime et renouveau des idées (XVIIIe-XIXe siècle)Sébastien Dubois, La publication des ordonnances dans les Pays-Bas autrichiens. Souveraineté, légalité, publicité
Claude Bruneel, Les ventes publiques en Brabant au XVIIIe siècle. Formes et procédures
Maxime Tondeur, La population civile, acteur majeur de la chasse aux déserteurs : un aperçu de l’évolution de la législation sur l’aide à la désertion dans les Pays-Bas autrichiens
Bernard Vandermeesch, Ces lois « qui ne sont pas des lois ». Doctrines et justifications ecclésiastiques contre le nouvel ordre législatif à la fin de l’Ancien Régime en Belgique
Fred Stevens, Guillaume Ier, codificateur du royaume des Pays-Bas et la « renationalisation » du droit (1815-1831)
Variations sur l’histoire du droit et son actualité
Paul De Win, La maison rasée. Regard historique sur les mesures et sanctions envers la demeure des contrevenants et malfaiteurs du moyen âge à nos jours
Annette Ruelle, Le pèlerin et la norme. L’art de la formule dans l’ancien droit romain, ou l’invention de l’État de droit par le rite
Jacques Krynen, Bien légiférer aujourd’hui. Lire Dupin, Bacon, Rebuffe et les autres… Promenade à reculons
Le présentSource: est à renvoyer aux Presses de l’Université Saint-Louis, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, B-1000 Bruxelles ou à l’adresse firstname.lastname@example.org avant le 30 septembre pour bénéficier du prix préférentiel de 45 €. Le montant sera de 65 € après cette date.RMBLF.be.
Règlement par virement bancaire sur le compte des Presses de l’Université Saint-Louis avec la communication « Souscription JM Cauchies + Nom et Prénom ».
IBAN : BE 44 0680 5185 8045 – BIC : GKCCBEBB
This collection of original essays brings together leading legal historians and theorists to explore the oft-neglected but important relationship between these two discplines. Legal historians have often been sceptical of theory. The methodology which informs their own work is often said to be an empirical one, of gathering information from the archives and presenting it in a narrative form. The narrative produced by history is often said to be provisional, insofar as further research in the archives might falsify present understandings and demand revisions. On the other side, legal theorists are often dismissive of historical works. History itself seems to many theorists not to offer any jurisprudential insights of use for their projects: at best, history is a repository of data and examples, which may be drawn on by the theorist for her own purposes. The aim of this collection is to invite participants from both sides to ask what lessons legal history can bring to legal theory, and what legal theory can bring to history. What is the theorist to do with the empirical data generated by archival research? What theories should drive the historical enterprise, and what wider lessons can be learned from it? This collection brings together a number of major theorists and legal historians to debate these ideas.Table of contents:
Part I: Introducing the Dialogue between Legal Theory and Legal HistoryMore information here.
Legal Theory and Legal History: Prospects for Dialogue (Michael Lobban) (3-21)
Beyond Universality and Particularity, Necessity and Contingency:
On Collaboration Between Legal Theory and Legal History (Maks Del Mar) (22-38)
Legal Theory and Legal History: A View from Anthropology (Fernanda Pirie) (39-44)
Legal Theory and Legal History: Which Legal Theory? (Sionaidh Douglas-Scott) (45-53)
Part II: Methodology and Historiography
Historicism and Materiality in Legal Theory (Christopher Tomlins) (57-83)
Legal Consciousness: A Metahistory (Jonathan Gorman) (84-105)
Modelling Law Diachronically: Temporal Variability in Legal Theory (Maks Del Mar) (108-126)
Is Comparative Law Necessary for Legal Theory? (John Bell) (127-146)
Part III: The History of Theory
Reading Juristic Theories In and Beyond Historical Context: The Case of Lundstedt’s Swedish Legal Realism (Roger Cotterrell) (149-166)
Legal Realism and Natural Law (Dan Priel & Charles Barzun) (167-187)
The Role of Rules: Legal Maxims in Early-modern Common Law Principle and Practice (Ian Williams) (188-205)
Theory in History: Positivism, Natural Law and Conjectural History in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-century English Legal Thought (Michael Lobban) (206-231)
Part IV: Uses and Limits of Theory in History
Legal History and Legal Theory Shaking Hands: Towards a Gentleman’s Agreement About a Deﬁnition of the State (Jean-Louis Halpérin and Pierre Brunet) (233-249)
Law, Self-interest, and the Smithian Conscience (Joshua Getzler) (250-283)
The Practical Dimension of Legal Reasoning (Stephen Waddams) (284-304)
Corrective Justice—An Idea Whose Time Has Gone? (Steve Hedley) (305-327)
How History Does and Does Not Bear on Jurisprudence (Brian Z Tamanaha) (329-340)